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exclusivity models to a lot of these clubs.
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Some are exclusive by virtue of being that top five percent of clubs in terms of price point.
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But you know, come on, I mean the best gms that I work with say that we help with their culture and oh damn okay so and oh damn okay so, I was gonna say because that leads right into predictive in information.
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But I want to talk about diddy uh no, I already hit recording.
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I was like, oh, it's gonna be a perfect segue, but no, we were chatting and I brought up diddy and just because it's like a relevant topic now, um, and and what?
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Because you know you, you know I do magic and stuff.
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So what, what you're saying about predicting the future?
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It's not predicting the future.
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It was predictive information yeah, well, what we do is provide information, and there's two ways that we provide it reactively, when something bad has happened and somebody says can you help us get our arms around the extent of this and who's at fault and you know what led to it.
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Right, that's the reactive.
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In terms of the club's case, it's proactive and the whole thing is based on the same tenants that you have a college application for.
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The same tenants that you would have a.
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You know that you would have pre-employment screening for it's that past actions and facts are indicative of future behavior.
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You know that you would have pre-employment screening for it's that past actions and facts are indicative of future behavior.
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You know, and I've said, I think, on your show, that I'm an optimist.
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I'm not really an optimist at all, but I say I'm an optimist and I believe that people can always turn a new leaf, except that they don't, you know, and so we do have those rare moments where somebody actually figures it out and changes Is that guessing when that's going to happen is probably not in anybody's best interest, whether it's membership in a club or for a job or any other reason that you would vet someone, and associations are really good at this.
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They've had standards for a reason.
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If somebody isn't meeting the standards, now's the time, don't let them in.
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When it comes to the club world, removing somebody is a nightmare.
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There's usually a very detailed process you have to go through, which involves disciplining the person in second try and third try.
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Each club is different, but that process is a mess.
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And so when you have somebody who shouldn't have gotten in in the first place, wow, what a waste of energy and resources, what a hit to the reputation of the club.
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All unnecessary.
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If you actually looked at facts and said we can't just rely on others vouching for people.
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And there's a really good book out there that talks about prediction.
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And have you heard of the book by Nisam Taleb called Anti-Fragile, the?
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name rings a bell.
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Okay.
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Taleb has written a number of books.
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He's incredibly well-read.
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The business community is all over him.
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I think anybody that's into behavioral analysis knows him and his work and whether you love him or hate him, anti-fragile really points out it's a very long book.
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It's a it's a little bit of a technical book.
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It takes some.
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You can't be reading this in bed before you fall asleep and soak it in, you need to be focused.
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But in the end, what it says is humans are really really bad at predicting things and there are a whole bunch of situations that we skew, whether or not they're fragile, right, meaning the odds of it failing and not working out the way I predict are very high versus things that are very low.
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Sports betting is very, very fragile.
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I might think I know all about who's going to win the college football playoff next year, but I don't and I'm biased toward teams and people and I have a lack of information.
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But I tell myself no way my team's going to win.
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So that's a little bit of an example.
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But this is no different for wealthy people that are on a member committee, on a board at a club, deciding someone's tape, whether it's a membership director, whether it's a GM.
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We're really bad at predicting things and when we have less information meaning it's all information controlled by the applicant, maybe a little bit of contribution from other members in the club they don't have all the information.
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And now we're doing this feel-good prediction that the person's going to work out and we just chose not to have facts.
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So it's kind of crazy, but the anti-fragile narrative plays out over and over again in this space.
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That's why, if you look at something and I go back to this because I think it works really well what it takes to get accepted into a public university, think about the process and all the documentation and all the review that they do and all the money they spend looking over those applications, because they actually know what's going to be successful at a university.
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They have really good predictive measures of whether you're going to make it or not.
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And, yeah, there's always going to be the person that flakes out and you wouldn't expect it to.
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You know the kid who has really good grades and really good behavior and then gets to the open light and space of being in a public university right, and ends up drinking themselves out.
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In the first term it happens, but more than likely if you have someone that hasn't been a good student, that hasn't behaved a certain way, they're going to wash out in a much greater proportion than the good students.
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So universities really have this down.
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Clubs just haven't embraced the fact that they've said we're kind of void of information and that information goes a long way.
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So the predictive value is I want to believe that you're saying you're going to be an amazing member, but I'd also like to see some actual reasons that I should believe that you're a physician to do that and when there are things that we find in that background information and in the OSIP research that show us that they actually behave differently.
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You know, that's the predicted value, right there, yeah and it's not.
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This isn't every like.
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How often do you find weird stuff I shouldn't say weird stuff like, how often is it?
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Like, how big of an issue is this?
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You know, like I'm just trying to, you know, put it into more like a layman's terms you know, like, out of 100 applicants, do you have like how many, like what percentage might be?
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You know, maybe we should watch out a little bit, because, because, because it's not every person I think you've told me that before most people are like, most things you find are, you know, it's, it's all.
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Everything matches up, it's the few and far between.
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Yeah.
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So a little bit of a complicated question because we do different, varying degrees of vetting for clubs.
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So we have some clubs that are very, very stringent in how to go you know, soup to nuts, through everything we can.
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Others are much more restrictive on the data we look at.
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What I can tell you is that the majority of people that apply for membership clubs there is no derogatory information or contrary information.
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Then we get into varying shades, right.
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So you put something on your application.
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It looks to me like it was a misrepresentation.
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You tried to look like you were you know all that and a bag of chips, and you really weren't even a bag of chips.
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So, but that's one or two data points.
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Then you get things like I see behaviors that you probably wouldn't engage in at the club, certainly when you're trying to get in.
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But if you feel free to do these things in other environments and you've done them in the recent past well gosh, that doesn't bode very well.
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Maybe I have someone here who's going to be violating the decorum policy before they've even set foot in the door.
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And then you get into finding the behaviors that are not necessarily criminal, but they're indicative of the fact that I don't follow the rules, I don't do what I'm supposed to do, so some of it, I guess you could frame it as criminal, but it's things like how I drive, it's things like citations, problems with insurance claims, right, and you get into aside from overt behaviors where someone is demonstrating and saying so got in big trouble because I jumped off the cruise ship.
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This is, this is one that we had.
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I jumped off the cruise ship and everybody was super angry and they had the whatever Antiguan Coast Guard out there and they stopped the ship and I had, you know, ok, I mean, really, you're grown up, you're 30, and you jumped off because it was hilarious, you know, and this isn't somebody who's like Steve-O from the Jackass series, it's.
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This is somebody who's, you know, sells insurance for a living and wants to join a golf club.
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If you're going to jump off a cruise ship when you get tuned up, what are you going to do with the club when you get tuned up Again?
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Maybe your club is okay with that, maybe your club has different standards.
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But you look for those behavioral things that say I'm not going to follow rules, I'm going to do what I want and it's not up to you.
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You have an opportunity to do that and it's not up to you.
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I haven't asked you to do that, and it's not up to you or Kenneth or anybody to decide who's good and who's bad.
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You're just presenting the information.
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It's ultimately the club can decide like oh, we don't care about that.
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So this is just the information that.
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I think sometimes clubs look at something like this as it's more in depth and it's like, well, no, they're not telling anybody what, what to do, it's just hey, we're just finding the juicy information that's just out there, um, and so so here here, here's a how um, you know, with something like that, how difficult is that to find?
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And like so, like you know, I'm trying to think of, like someone applies for, for membership at my, how easy is it to find that, or how difficult, or you know.
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I guess that's another you know boiled question there, but I'll let you answer.
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Sure.
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So again, it sort of depends on what the club is engaging me, how deep they're engaging us to look.
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I've talked previously about the fact that the information is not linear, meaning if you want to find out information about you or me or anyone else, you're going to get some information directly from me, things like my LinkedIn I put that up, I control that information, my Facebook.
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But really I'll give you the cruise ship jumper example.
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That was hosted by a friend who was on the cruise and it's not tagged as being the member.
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So if I were on that person's social media I would see the hilarious guy jumping off.
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It doesn't say who it is, so we can identify who he is.
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The club can identify who he is.
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It's him.
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So we can identify who he is.
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The club can identify who he is.
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It's him.
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So finding that involved us looking into that sphere, right.
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So we have to go into buckets where we don't necessarily know there's going to be information and the information is going to be unstructured.
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When we find it, then we can present it.
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Now that, you know, also feeds into the breadcrumbs idea, and that's that we find one and then we go to the next one and the next one and the next one.
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So, opening that up, said, okay, this person has a group of people and, by the way, we've got coinciding dates.
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These are the people that were on the ship.
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These are the people that also are friends with that person.
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Let's start quickly looking in those buckets.
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That's when we find the story of dude.
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And it's by the first name, we'll call him steve Dude.
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And it's by the first name, we'll call him Steve.
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Steve actually had the Antiguan Coast Guard called out and they stopped the frigging ship and they kicked he and the wife off the ship and they're banned from the cruise line forever.
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And none of that was posted directly by him.
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I'm pretty sure he doesn't want his employer to see that right Works for big companies, but it's there.
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And so where you let me look dictates how much I'm going to find.
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And then from there it's not easy.
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It's not as easy as getting the tech savvy kid that works in the office of the club to look on Facebook.
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Certainly do that, because sometimes that's a layup and you find the easy information, but that's what you're paying for a company like mine to do is to look for any and all facts that aren't easy to find and that takes the right training, the right equipment, access.
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And the craziest thing is how busy our R&D department is, because things are rolling out at a continuous basis, things like data breach data.
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Once it becomes public and it's out there, it's full of intimate details about things.
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But even these breaches that happened four or five years ago.
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We find all kinds of information from the data breach data which doesn't live anywhere.
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But if you have it and you have it on a server and you download it every time data breach information is published, well then you've got a whole new repository of stuff that people tapping Google are never going to find, but it's public and it's laying around waiting to have.
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So, in terms of home gamers, thinking about doing what we do and being successful, limited opportunity.
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Can you briefly go into like so something like finding Mr Jumper here, what level package about is?
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Is that information getting?
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Is that more of like?
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The?
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Is that like higher end?
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Is that more of like?
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Is that like higher end?
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Is that more of the middle?
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No, that was real close to the middle.
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Yeah, maybe a bit above the middle, I think.
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In total, you know, we offer nine packages really, with number nine being the nuclear variant and number one being a lot of public record data just done correctly.
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What I mean by that is if you think about pre-employment screening and the $29.95 super background search that you see advertised all over the web, you want to do a background check on your neighbor, so you go to whatever Zippy search and it's $19.95.
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Those are data.
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Brokers sell information.
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What they also sell you is a disclaimer.
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So there's several asterisks that say based on where we looked, which was under my iPhone based on where we looked, these are the records that we found, and so they limit what they're looking at and they buy data that's already available.
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And so they limit what they're looking at and they buy data that's already available and it's always incomplete.
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It's grossly incomplete.
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They come up with things like a national background check.
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There is no national background check.
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Our records are firewalled off.
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They're very difficult to find If you're using someone with a common name.
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It's a nightmare.
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You have to have skills, processes, tools to do that stuff, and so when we offer a low-end package.
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We do the public record thing correctly.
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We figure out all the places where records could exist and we search all of them.
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We don't use a data broker who says this is what I've got and no, it's not complete and it'll never be complete.
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They try and be a little more artful with their disclaimers than what I was saying, but that's the reality.
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There isn't a place to go.
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The CSI shows and the person with the cool haircut on the keyboard who finds everything in five seconds oh, look at this.
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That's a fantasy, and the record system in this country is becoming more wild than ever before.
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So you can get the records, but you have to pay to get them.
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You have to search a certain way, you have to pay, whether or not you get a response or not.
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These municipalities have figured out this is a money-making adventure now, and so freedom has a price and you have to know who would have jurisdiction.
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We have issues all the time.
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We have a club that's in Memphis and it was a struggle with them to say well, you want us to pay a little bit more, and I said no, because you sit on the border of Mississippi, arkansas and Tennessee.
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So people have records and the Arkansas records are not available in Tennessee.
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No matter how hard I look, I can't find them.
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They're walled off and if you don't want me to look in those places, don't complain when somebody you talk about.
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You know you and I have talked about how it, but within that package the jumper was probably very near the middle, maybe a little above the middle.
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We look at the sphere and we do that literally like an onion, one layer at a time.
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Do you want this additional layer of searching?
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The bad news with the additional layer is you're spending a little bit of money and a lot of what I'm finding when I go to that next level is stuff I've already found.
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That's OK, I'm going to find unique stuff.
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But each time we move a little bit further out, it's probably the law of diminishing returns, so pricing of our packages sort of also decreases, even though we've got a lot of information that we have to find a second time or a third time or a fourth time.
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It's just the nature of the beast.
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I'm trying to figure out.
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Now I want to go back to the predictive information.
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How can like?
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What's the?
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What I'm looking for?
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And I'll let me make a note.
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Um, what are some like takeaways for?
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Like, so?
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So, when it comes to predictive information, is it?
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Is it you and your company?
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Is it like?
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Are you the the predictive informator?
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Like, so like?
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Are you the one taking all the information and looking?
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Is it programs?
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Is it um?
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no, in terms of the information we presented.
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And then we presented an informant where things that we think are and the term is responsive things that we think would actually make someone pause or that they would want to evaluate we their court record history, for instance right, if they are posting things that are inflammatory directly, obviously those are going to go near the top and we keep going and presenting it in an order Because of the volume of what we found.
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Most of our report is comprised of links, and those are links to data that we found.
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So it's definitely a data point about Denny Corby, but it really isn't going to make any difference.
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It's yet another address history in yet another database that's on the web, right.
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So it's something that we found.
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It's the fact that you had a MySpace and there's a directory that said that you had a MySpace years ago, and that kind of information usually isn't contributory toward making a decision.
00:19:31.132 --> 00:19:46.497
But again, we disclose everything that we find and we don't evaluate it, we just present it and you know there are things that you can say in Texas that you probably can't socially say in Northern California.
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We're just a diverse country and the behaviors and norms in one place are insults in another, and so I have to leave it up to the clubs to sort of say you know what matters to us and remember, we're not just about yes or no, it's not just red or green.
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Sometimes there's a conversation to be had, so we'll provide data and someone will say well, this is an unfortunate thing, but it was five years ago.
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It's not the best, but I'm going to bring it up to the member and I'm going to remind them that at the club, something like that would really be frowned upon.
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And to make sure that you're clear that you're joining a club where the behaviors are different than those and you set the tone.
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How about you have that conversation and then they defend themselves and say no, I'm going to act over and over.
00:20:33.457 --> 00:20:39.007
Oh cool, now I just need to get out your unfit for membership.
00:20:39.007 --> 00:20:44.951
You know, and it gives the clubs opportunities to work with that data in different ways to help them with the decision making process.
00:20:45.553 --> 00:20:48.775
It's not always a layoff, the guy that jumps off the ship.
00:20:48.775 --> 00:21:02.071
I'm betting there's some clubs that would say if he jumps off the cabana roof into the pool a couple times, you know, with the Jägermeister bottle it's okay, and other clubs it would be.
00:21:02.071 --> 00:21:03.253
This is not the right time.
00:21:03.253 --> 00:21:04.856
I think that that's a big part of it.
00:21:04.856 --> 00:21:09.107
What's going on in your life and is this the right time?
00:21:09.127 --> 00:21:15.833
I had a club who came back and called me and said you found that the police were at their house four times in the last year.
00:21:15.833 --> 00:21:19.619
I did yes, that's correct, that's the data.
00:21:19.619 --> 00:21:21.251
Four times the police were called to the house.
00:21:21.251 --> 00:21:23.625
I don't have more than that.
00:21:23.625 --> 00:21:25.744
That department doesn't tell me the nature of the runs.
00:21:25.744 --> 00:21:28.875
But what's going on in the house?
00:21:28.875 --> 00:21:30.550
The police are coming four times.
00:21:30.625 --> 00:21:31.990
How often have the police been to your house, denny?
00:21:31.990 --> 00:21:33.830
Probably a lot in your case.
00:21:33.830 --> 00:21:42.332
Regular folk usually don't need the police a lot and doesn't four times stand out.
00:21:42.332 --> 00:21:44.511
So what's going on?
00:21:44.511 --> 00:21:52.638
So when you add four times to some other behaviors that say maybe I'm not a perfect fit, it makes it a lot easier.
00:21:52.638 --> 00:21:56.115
But I think that's the whole point of being exclusive, right.
00:21:56.115 --> 00:22:13.472
That's the whole point of you have to exclude sometimes and you have to set a baseline, and I think there's probably even situations where now is not the right time for you to join our club and we're being a little bit choosy and you have more defects than most of our normal members.
00:22:13.472 --> 00:22:16.030
So why am I rolling the dice on you right now?
00:22:16.030 --> 00:22:33.977
You know, and maybe we'll see in a couple years if it changes, or you know, and that's a decision that they're going to have to make, but I think you have people think about it this way Would you invest money with someone that was showing signs that they don't follow rules?
00:22:34.964 --> 00:22:41.358
And also you found out I told you from an investment due diligence standpoint they had the police at their house four times.
00:22:41.358 --> 00:22:43.125
No, they don't have a criminal record for the shooting.
00:22:43.125 --> 00:22:44.550
They wouldn't have taken away a handcuff.
00:22:44.550 --> 00:22:50.493
Would that make you feel super good about handing them $3 million to start a new venture?
00:22:50.493 --> 00:22:53.380
Probably not.
00:22:53.380 --> 00:22:59.153
At a minimum, there'd be a conversation, right, and you'd hope that there'd be a really quick answer.
00:22:59.153 --> 00:22:59.914
And you know what.
00:22:59.914 --> 00:23:02.375
You can always call me back and say this is the answer they gave me.
00:23:02.375 --> 00:23:03.359
Can you help me verify that?
00:23:03.359 --> 00:23:05.991
That's always a possibility.
00:23:05.991 --> 00:23:10.957
Clubs can always call and say here's the additional information we obtained about that.
00:23:10.957 --> 00:23:12.670
Can you provide the insight?
00:23:12.670 --> 00:23:17.794
Sometimes I can't, sometimes there isn't more to get, but a lot of times there is once I know something else.
00:23:18.726 --> 00:23:26.711
The secret to the story is the police officer was really his fiance and he wanted to see her, so he would call the police.
00:23:26.711 --> 00:23:32.516
He would call 911 to say, hey, send over so-and-so, I need help.
00:23:33.156 --> 00:23:36.192
She shows up, it seems like a long way around there.
00:23:41.773 --> 00:24:01.209
But so I was saying this earlier I feel like now is the time for clubs to try so many new things and like push the barrier a little bit, or even like now is the time to, if they might want to do a little bit more of like investigative, backgroundy, fact checking on their members.
00:24:01.209 --> 00:24:04.298
Like now is the time there's there's hasn't been a better.